A nonatomic‐game model for timing clearance sales under competition

We deal with dynamic revenue management (RM) under competition using the nonatomic‐game approach. Here, a continuum of heterogeneous sellers try to sell the same product over a given time horizon. Each seller can lower his price once at the time of his own choosing, and faces Poisson demand arrival with a rate that is the product of a price‐sensitive term and a market‐dependent term. Different types of sellers interact, and their respective prices help shape the overall market in which they operate, thereby influencing the behavior of all sellers. Using the infinite‐seller approximation, which deprives any individual seller of his influence over the entire market, we show the existence of a certain pattern of seller behaviors that collectively produce an environment to which the behavior pattern forms a best response. Such equilibrium behaviors point to the suitability of threshold‐like pricing policies. Our computational study yields insights to RM under competition, such as profound ways in which consumer and competitor types influence seller behaviors and market conditions. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 365–385, 2014     

地月转移轨道设计的改进微分校正方法

地月转移轨道设计是探月关键技术之一,微分校正法是公认的解决非线性迭代问题的有效方法。针对探月任务中地月转移轨道设计精度高、计算速度快等要求,提出一种改进的微分校正快速设计方法。该方法基于DE405/LE405星历数据下日、地、月和地球J2项摄动真实轨道动力学模型,推导了近月点和入轨点设计参数偏导数关系,在积分轨道状态量的同时积分微分校正矩阵,用积分得到的准确微分校正矩阵求逆,快速迭代得到轨道设计结果。仿真结果表明,利用该方法设计地月转移轨道收敛速度远优于同等精度动力学模型—序列二次规划算法。     

联合补充博弈的费用分摊

就一个仓库、多个零售商,对联合订货费用函数的模型进行分析,给出了一个求解最佳订货周期的多项式时间的算法,且算法的时间复杂性为O（nlogn）。利用文献[8]中的技巧,给出了该库存博弈的核。     

改进博弈论的舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配

目标分配问题是UAV自主控制的重要问题。针对舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配问题,首先建立了基于离散动态贝叶斯网络的目标价值评估模型,在此基础上构建了舰载无人机编队的益损值矩阵,设计了舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配的决策函数,提出了一种基于改进博弈论的目标分配方法,为4种不同约束条件下的目标分配问题分别设计了算法。最后对所建立的目标价值评估模型和改进博弈论的目标分配算法进行了实例仿真,仿真结果表明了模型和算法的可行性和有效性。     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016     

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

The solution to an open problem for a caching game

In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016     

激光焦点控制磁力驱动的控制特性实验对比分析

为了满足激光焦点控制系统的位置和速度响应要求,设计了一种轴向放置、轴向磁化的环形永磁体自复位的3自由度激光焦点磁力驱动微动平台。根据该微动平台的结构进行力学分析并建立动力学方程,在此基础上进行微动平台的比例、积分、微分控制实验和鲁棒控制实验。通过两种不同控制策略的对比分析,结果表明,两种控制策略都能实现微动平台的稳定驱动,但是在比例、积分、微分控制策略下,响应速度更好,在鲁棒控制策略下,抗干扰能力更好。     

Purchase and retrieval competition for seasonal produce

We study the competition problem of purchase and multiretrieval of perishable seasonal produce, where wholesalers purchase and stock their products in the first period, and then retrieve and sell them in subsequent periods. We first consider the duopoly case and assume that the prices are exogenous and fluctuate. In each period, after the price realization, the wholesalers retrieve some stock from their warehouses to satisfy their demands. One wholesaler's unsatisfied customers can switch to another and be satisfied by its left retrieved products. Any unsold retrieved stock has no salvage value and any unsatisfied demand is lost. The unretrieved stock is carried to the next period at a perishable rate. The wholesalers compete for the substitute demand by determining their own purchase and retrieval quantities. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and that the Nash equilibrium strategy has the simple “sell-down-to” structure. We also consider the general N-person game and show the existence of the Nash equilibrium, and characterize the structure of the equilibrium strategy for the symmetric case. In addition, we consider the case with endogenous prices, and show that the problem reduces to a repeated newsvendor game with price and inventory competition. We derive the conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to examine the impacts of the model parameters on the equilibrium outcomes and to generate managerial insights.     

利用微分几何参数研究小型阵列的布局

以微分几何为工具,分析和研究了小型阵列的阵列流形的微分几何参数与信号到达方向估计精度之间的关系,并在此基础上推导分析了小型阵列在各个方向上的测向性能与阵列几何布局之间的关系,最后给出小型阵列布局的设计思路。并以五元阵为例,对几种不同的几何布局进行仿真对比和分析,验证了设计思路的正确性。